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The 'Most Important and Fundamental' 
Distinction in Logic 
G. C. GODDU University of Richmond 
Abstract: In this paper I argue that the de-
bate over the purported distinction between 
deductive and induct ive arguments can be 
bypassed because making the dist inction is 
unnecessary for successfully evaluating ar-
guments. I provide a foundation for doing 
logic that makes no appeal to the distinction 
and st ill performs all the relevant tasks re-
quired of an analysis of arguments. I also 
reply to objections to the view that we can 
dispense with the distinction. Finally. I con-
clude that the distinction between inducti ve 
and deductive arguments is not one of the 
most important and fundamental ideas in 
logic, but rather is unnecessary . 
Resume: Jc defends "idee que Ie: deba! 
sur la distinction entre les arguments 
dcduclifs cl inductifs peut eln: 
abandonnc parcc que ceUe dIstinction 
n 'cst pas ncccssaire pour bien evaluer un 
argument. Je decris un fondement pour 
I'evaluation des arguments qui ne fait pas 
appd a cette distinction, mais qui tout 
de meme tlent compte de toutes Ics tachcs 
pertinentes pour une evaluation bien 
reussic. Jc rcponds it des objections 
contre I'idee qu'on pcut se dispenser de 
l'usage de ccttc distinct ion. Je conclus 
que la di stinction entre des arguments 
inductifs e t deductifs n'est pas une des 
idees Jes plus importanLes et 
fondamentales de la logique. et qu'eJle 
n'est meme pas neccssaire. 
Keywords: Argument, deductive, inductive, adequacy, reasoning 
Nicholas Rescher, in An introduction to Logic, writes, '[t]he distinction between 
deductive and inductive arguments is one of the most important and fundamental 
ideas in logic. " The distinction is not limited to logic: it shows up in rhetoric, legal 
reasoning, the philosophy of science, and many discussions concerning argumen-
tation in general. The distinction is pervasive, but not without controversy. As-
suming Rescher is correct, one wants to know exactly what the fundamental and 
important distinction is and here tremendous disagreement and conflict exists. I 
hope to bypass the disagreement about what exactly the distinction is by attacking 
the prevailing sentiment embodied in Rescher's statement. I shall argue that the 
distinction between deductive and inductive arguments, if there even is one, is not 
important or fundamental at all. Trying to distinguish deductive and inductive ar· 
guments is completely unnecessary. 
In Section I, I shall briefly outline the traditional structure of the debate cOn-
cerning making the distinction and justify my undercutting of the traditional struc-
ture. In Section II, I shall provide a foundation for doing logic that makes no 
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appeal to the distinction and is able to perfonn all the relevant tasks we want of an 
analysis of arguments. In Section III , I shall consider actual and possible objec-
tions to the view that we can dispense with the distinction. Finally, T shall conclude 
that the distinction between inductive and deductive arguments is not One of the 
most important and fundamental ideas in logic, but rather is irrelevant and unnec-
essary . 
Despite the almost universal agreement with Rescher's sentiment, there is little 
agreement on the exact nature of the alleged distinction between deductive and 
inductive arguments. Consider, for example, the following quotations from recent 
logic textbooks: 
A deductive argument is one whose conclusion is claimed to fo llow from its 
premises with absolute necessity , .. . in sharp contrast, an inductive argument 
is one whose conclusion is claimed to follow from its premises only with 
probability, this probability being a matter of degree and dependent upon 
what else may be the case,2 
In a deductive argument, the conclusion is contained implicitly within the 
premises; the argument merely draws it out, making it explicit. .. ' [Tn an induc-
tive argumynt the] conclusion is certainly supported by fhe premises, but it 
is not contained in them in the same way as in deduction.3 
There are inductive families- families of arguments appropriately evaluated 
by inductive means . Likewise there are deductive fami li es. Recognizing that 
an argument belongs to one of those families allows us to c lassify it as 
inductive or deductive ,4 
Debate concerning how to draw the distinction between deductive and induc-
tive arguments has traditionally been structured as follows: Firstly, demonstrate 
why previous attempts to make the distinction are inadequate and then secondly, 
either (i) merely suggest how a viable distinction might be fonnulated, or (ii) 
actuall y provide and defend a new version of the distinction, or (iii) argue that 
some distinction with more than just the two traditional categories is required or 
(iv) abandon the distinction altogether. 
Given that, to date, I have found no fewer than 20 different versions of the 
distinction, to do the first step justice, I would need to argue against all these 
distinctions and that would be a long and tedious task' Instead, T shall undercut 
the entire traditional debate by arguing that even if there were an agreed upon 
viable distinction, it wouldn't do any work that couldn't get done in a more elegant 
way. Put another way- we can do our job as logicians just as well , if not better, 
without making a purported di stinction between deductive and inductive argu-
ments. If so, the burden of proof should be on the advocates of the distinction to 
prove that the distinction is necessary or, at least, that making the distinction is 
more useful than not making it. Also, if I can show that we do not need a distinc-
tion between deductive and inductive arguments, then we need not bother with 
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either step in the traditional debate. I tum now to my own account and my defense 




Regardless of whether one thinks arguments can be profitably subdivided into 
deductive and inductive classes, we first need to know what an argument is, I 
define 'argument' as follows: 
(i) An argument is a group of statements, one of which is designated the 
conclusion. 
For example, from the text:' All is well in Denmark and George is in Denmark, 
so George is well' we can extract the statements: 'All is well in Denmark,' ' George 
is in Denmark,' and 'George is well.' (Exactly how one breaks compound sen-
tences into the relevant statements is not my concern here.) The illative 'so' in 
the original text designates 'George is well' as the conclusion, so the text is an 
argument, which we can also represent as follows: 
All is well in Denmark. 
George is in Denmark. 
George is well. 
Many might object that the definition omits the essential feature that makes a 
group of statements an argument- namely that there is some connection between 
the conclusion and the remaining statements, the premises. The exact nature of 
the alleged connection is certainly not agreed upon, but, for the most part, 'argu-
ment' has been defined such that to be an argument the conclusion must be claimed 
to follow frorn 6, or affirmed on the basis of' the premises or the premises must be 
attributed favorable relevance t08, or be taken to support" the conclusion, etc. 
Is some connection between conclusion and premises truly an essential part of 
being an argument? Not everyone defines 'argument' such that it is. 1O Also, 
suppose someone writes an argument generator program that works by having the 
computer randomly generate sentences ofEngJish and then print them out in groups 
of three, with the word 'Conclusion' before the last. Some outputs of such a 
program might be: 
The sky is purple. 
All humans have a nose. 
Conclusion: All is well in Denmark. 
George is human. 
All humans have a nose. 
Conclusion: George has a nose. 
Neither the programmer nor the computer claims that the conclusion follows 
from or is supported by the premises, yet to deny that the computer outputs 
arguments is to repudiate the programmer's intentions, the quite explicit form of 
the computer' s output, and our ability to coherently ask whether the outputs con-
stitute good or bad arguments. 
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Perhaps some will claim that the computer' s outputs count as arguments be-
cause even though there is no explicit claim, there is the implicit claim or implica-
tion that the conclusion is supposed to follow from the premises. What could be 
the sourCe of this implication? The only candidate is the designation of the last 
sentence as the conclusion. Nothing else is present to distinguish the computer's 
outputs from mere lists of statements. If conclusions are just those statements 
arrived at on the basis of others, then by designating one statement as the conclu-
sion we imply it follows from, or at least is supposed to follow from, the others. 
B!-J.t if the mere designation of one statement as the conclusion is sufficient to 
imply it is supposed to follow from the others, then the given definition of 'argu-
ment' does not omit the alleged essential feature of arguments. 
The only other option is to deny that the computers ' outputs are arguments on 
the grounds that the mere designation of one of a set of statements as the conclu-
sion is not sufficient to imply that it is supposed to follow from the others. But 
then countless other texts naturally construed as arguments must also be rejected. 
For example, 'Socrates is a man, so Socrates is monal' Or 'Socrates is mortal , 
thus Socrates is a living being' would have to be rejected as arguments because 
there is nothing but the conclusion indicators ' 50' and 'thus' to imply any connec-
tion between conclusion and premise. If'so' and 'thus' alone are insufficient and 
to be an argument requires some connection between conclusion and premises, 
then, contra the natural interpretation, the Socrates texts are not really arguments. 
Hence, if the mere designation of a conclusion is not sufficient to imply the con-
clusion is supposed to follow from the remaining statements, then a connection 
between premises and conclusion is not an essential part of being an argument. 
To sum up: either the mere designation of one statement as the conclusion 
implies a connection or it does not. If it does, then the given definition implies a 
connection and so should satisfy those who claim that a connection between 
conclusion and premises is an essential part of being an argument. If it does not, . 
then a connection between premises and conclusion is not an essential part of 
being an argument, for otherwise too many texts that express arguments would be 
ruled non-arguments. 
One final comment about the definition of argument. The most common means 
of designating the conclusion is via an illative such as 'so,' 'hence,' or 'thus, ' etc. 
However, while examining and enumerating the various ways of designating con-
clusions is not my concern here, I will point out that the designation of the conclu-
sion need not be explicit and in some cases the conclusion itself can be left implied. 
For example, consider the following paragraph from Descartes' Meditations on 
First Philosophy: 
Surely whatever I had admitted until now as most true I received either from 
the senses or through the senses. However, I have noticed that the senses 
are sometimes deceptive; and it is a mark of prudence never to place our 
complete trust in those who have deceived us even once. I I 
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Given Descartes' already stated goal of casting all his former opinions into 
doubt by attacking the principles upon which those opinions are founded, the 
following argument can be extracted from the text: 
The senses are sometimes deceptive. 
We should not place our complete trust in those who have deceived us even 
once. 
We should not place our complete trust in the senses. 
Whatever I had admitted until now as most true I received either from the 
senses or through the senses. 
All I had admitted until now as most true should not be completely trusted. 
Descartes states neither conclusion explicitly and so designates neither conclusion 
explicitly, yet clearly Descartes is offering an argument in the quoted passage. 
B, Adequate Arguments 
Suppose we have an argument, a group of statements, one of which is designated 
the conclusion. Presumably, our primary concern is to know whether the argu-
ment is good or not. A t the very least, for an argument to be good the premises 
must provide adequate support for the conclusion. What exactly is adequate sup-
port? I define ' adequate support' , as follows: 
(ii) The premises adequately support the conclusion in a context, T, iff 
the strength by which the premises support the conclusion in T is at 
least as 'great as the strength required by T. 
The context of an argument will be the relevant features of either the actual 
situation in which the argument is used or the hypothetical situation in which we 
are imagining the argument being used. Which features are relevant? At the very 
least, those features that have a bearing on the evaluation of the argument. In 
regards to adequate support the relevant facts will be those facts that are being 
held constant for the determination of how probable the conclusion is, given the 
premises and those facts that bear on how much support the conclusion requires. 
In order to further clarify adequate support, I provide the following examples. 
Example I: Consider the following argument: 
(I) All examined emeralds up to now are green, so the next emerald 
examined will be green. 
If the premise alone is the only fact held constant through all logically possible 
situations, then there is a certain degree of support, call it n, that the premise 
conveys upon the conclusion. If, however, we also hold constant that the laws of 
the universe do not change immediately after 'now' we presumably get a support 
value greater than n. If, on the other hand, we hold constant that a process for 
artificially producing red emeralds has just been developed, we might get a support 
value less than n. So depending upon which, if any, additional facts are held con-
stant, the premise will provide varying degrees of support to the conclusion. The 
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facts that, in addition to the premises, are held constant will be part of the context 
of the argument. 
Example II: Suppose the prosecution in a criminal trial has a body of evidence, 
E, that makes it probable beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime. So the prosecution argues, 
(2) E, so the defendant committed the crime. 
Suppose also that the defence is unable to provide any further relevant evidence. 
Ideally the jury convicts. Now suppose, however, that the defense introduces a 
piece of evidence not included in E; viz, that the gloves found at the crime scene 
do not fit the defendant. Suppose further that given that the gloves do not fit, E, 
whilestill making it highly likely, no longer makes it probable beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime. Ideally, the defendant is found not 
guilty. Finally, suppose that the exact same argument, ' E, so the defendant com-
mitted the crime' is made at a civil trial. The defense introduces the evidence that 
the gloves do not fit, and yet given the preponderance of the evidence-standard in 
civil trials, the jury still convicts. 
The prosecution's argument, made in a context involving no further evidence 
and a support requirement of beyond reasonable doubt succeeds, but made in a 
context involving the fact that the gloves do not fit fails to meet the support re-
quirement. Lower the degree of support required for the conclusion and the argu-
ment once again succeeds. Hence, facts determining what degree of support is 
required are part of the context. 
As the examples show, adequate support depends upon the context of the 
argument. When Descartes seeks certainty, nothing less than the premises making 
the conclusion absolutely certain will do. When a medical researcher argues that a 
new drug is safe, we demand an extremely high degree of confidence. When we 
engage in our everyday lives, a reasonable level of assurance will do. When a 
defense lawyer attempts to acquit his or her client, reasonable doubt of the ac-
cused's guilt will do. 
. Given the definition of adequate support we can .define arguments as adequate 
as follows: 
(iii) An argument is adequate in a context T itT the premises adequately 
support the conclusion in T. 
In addition, I shall define arguments as good as follows: 
(iv) An argument is good in a context T iff all the premises are true and 
the argument is adequate,'2 
Definitions (i)-(iv) hold for all arguments, To determine the goodness of an 
argument, any argument, we need to know whether the premises are all true and 
whetherthe argument is adequate, To determine whether the argument is adequate 
we need to know the actual support the premises convey on the conclusion and 
the support required by the context. No distinction between inductive and deduc-
tive arguments is needed. 
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However, just to reassure you that I do not diverge from actual logic practice 
too much. let me mention a special case of adequacy, viz. validity. Since necessity 
is the highest degree of strength, any argument in which the conclusion follows 
from the premises by necessity is one in which the actual strength of the premise/ 
conclusion relationship is greater than the required strength. Hence, any argument 
in which the premises necessitate the conclusion is adequate. Traditionally, such 
arguments are said to be valid, which I define as follows: 
(v) An argument is valid iffit is impossible for all the premises to be true 
and the conclusion false. 
Regardless of the contextually required strength, valid arguments are such that 
the premises adequately support the conclusion. Since determining validity is straight-
forward, and, unlike any other case of adequacy, context independent, validity is, 
not surprisingly, the most studied adequacy condition and also the most amenable 
to fonnal investigation. 
But what· of cases in which the argument is not valid, but some strength less 
than absolute necessity is sufficient? Without doubt, evaluation becomes a much 
more difficult task and disagreement concerning evaluation becomes much more 
pronounced. especially in an endeavour in which one is trying to convince others 
of some proposition based on other propositions. Such disagreements might help 
explain why determining adequacy in all but the limiting case of validity is a much 
more nebulous and subjective affair. ll 
The methods and problems of actually determining with a sufficient degree of 
accuracy both the actual degree of support and the required degree of support are 
well beyond the scope of this paper. Regardless, I can at least suggest the follow-
ing. Firstly, the extensive work in probability theory will be relevant to determining 
the actual degree of support. Secondly, ideally, the required degree of strength will 
be determined by an interplay of (i) the goal of accepting truths and rejecting 
falsehoods and (ii) the cost of rejecting what turn ourto be truths and (iii) the cost 
of accepting what turn out to be falsehoods. We reject Descartes ' demands for 
absolute certainty concerning matters of fact, for it accepts so few , if any. matters 
of fact as true that we could not function in the world. We accept pure mathemat-
ics' demands for absolute certainty, because there is linle, if any, cost to rejecting 
what turn out to be truths. I4 Since the consequences of serious side effects in a 
drug for treating headaches are more severe than the consequences of serious side 
effects in a drug given to otherwise terminal patients, the degree of confidence 
required for the claim that a drug is safe can vary. In legal situations, we try to 
balance the consequences of failing to protect society and of punishing the inno-
cent to arrive at those levels of support required for conviction. In general, one 's 
willingness to adopt or act upon a proposition is , ideally, at least partially deter-
mined by the consequences of accepting the proposition and the proposition turn-
ing out to be false. 
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Do we need to make the distinction between deductive and inductive argu-
ments in order to determine whether or not an argument is adequate or not? No. 
All that is required is that we first determine with a sufficient degree of precision 
the actual strength of the relationship between premises and conclusion. If the 
strength is necessity then the argument is valid and thus adequate. If the strength 
is not necessity, then we need to determine what strength is required with enough 
specificity to determine whether the actual strength is at least as great as the 
required strength. If the actual strength is at least as great as the required strength, 
then the argument is adequate; otherwise it is not. 
So it is adequacy and the truth of premises which are relevant for evaluating 
arguments, not determining whether an argument is deductive or inductive. Any 
argument can be properly evaluated without ever determining what kind of argu-
ment is being presentedY 
III 
I now turn to five objections to my claim that making the distinction between 
inductive and deductive arguments is unnecessary. 
Objection 1: Actual Practice 
Samuel Fohr, in response to a proposal advanced by David Hitchcock, writes: 
In wishing to discard the deductive-inductive distinction Hitchcock is run-
ning up against the actual practice of philosophers doing logic. When 
faced with judging the worth of an argument philosophers will commonly 
decide how it is to be analyzed and only then examine it. In other words, 
antecedently to judging it they will decide how it is to be judged .... Are 
philosophers deluded into thinking that arguments fall into two catego-
ries? Have they been going about things in the wrong way for these many 
years?\6 
Trudy Govier shares Fohr's concerns when she writes, ' one naturally hesi-
tates to think that a distinction which has been around for so long, and around 
which so much teaching of logic has been organized, could simply be ill-founded.' '' 
Reply: I am not convinced that Fohr is in fact right about the actual practice of 
argument evaluators, i.e. that prior to judging arguments we determine how it is to 
be judged. Regardless, suppose Fohr is correct about actual practice. Are philoso-
phers, therefore, by my account deluded? Have they been teaching logic organ-
ized around an ill-founded distinction? The answer to both questions is quite 
possibly ' yes.' Logicians did logic a la Aristotle for centuries. One need only look 
at the contortions 19th century logicians went through, trying to force arguments 
into the categorical forms to realize that Aristotle's system was grossly insuffi-
cient for the task. Despite thousands of years of tradition, Aristotle's categorical 
logic is no longer a primary logical system. The mere fact that a practice has been 
engaged in for a long time in no way indicates that the practice is necessary or 
useful or even adequate for achieving the goals for which the practice was imple-
mented. 
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I admit that just saying that perhaps traditional logic practice is fundamentally 
flawed might strike many as unsatisfactory. After all, presumably present logi-
cians are not blindly following in the footsteps of those who came before. Surely, 
some might object, there has to be something to the inductive/deductive distinc-
tion such that it has occupied such a central place in the teaching and study of 
logic. 
I grant that perhaps there is something to the distinction, for I am only claiming 
that there is no need to type arguments as either deductive or inductive and there 
are several distinctions one could make that are Ca) consistent with my framework 
and Cb) could capture what logicians are trying to articulate when they appeal to 
induction VS. deduction. For example, some logicians distinguish deductive rea-
soning from inductive reasoning or deductive logic from inductive logic without 
distinguishing deductive arguments from inductive arguments. 18 
I am perfectly willing to distinguish deductive/inductive reasonings or logics. 
Reasonings, we can hold, just are mental acts or processes- happenings inside 
our heads which are not accessible to logicians for general inspection. 19 Reason-
ings can be split into at least two kinds--<leductions and inductions. To deduce A 
from B is to come to believe that A must be true on the basis of B. To induce A 
from B is to come to believe that A is reasonable, but not necessary, on the basis of 
B. The distinction between the two types of reasonings, i.e. deductions and induc-
tions, is one of what we believe the relationship between conclusion and premises 
to be. 
But what we believe the relationship to be is irrelevant to the goodness or 
badness of arguments-sets of statements, one of which is designated the conclu-
sion. One can believe that the fact we are all mortal merely makes it probable we 
will all die, and can believe that the fact that grass is green makes it certain that 
Jupiter is the mightiest of all the gods, and be wrong in both instances. To deter-
rnine the adequacy of argurnents we need to discover what the actual relationship 
is and what the contextually required relationship is and compare the two. What 
we believe the relationship to be is irrelevant. 
The rnoral is not to conflate the reasonings, the mental processes, that go on 
inside our heads, with the arguments, the sets of statements, we advance. 2o I will 
grant that we may capture or express pari of the reasoning from A to B when we 
write the argument' AI thus B.' But it is only a part and we do not want to conflate 
the two or think that because there are deductive and inductive reasonings there 
must be deductive and inductive arguments. Reasonings can be usefully distin-
guished on the basis of what the reasoner believes lhe relationship between premises 
and conclusion to be, but arguments cannot. At the same time, we can ground or 
explain the goodness or badness of particular deductive or inductive reasonings 
without appealing to corresponding deductive or inductive arguments. Instead we 
can hold that valid arguments with true premises will ground good deductive rea-
sonings, and adequate but invalid arguments with true premises will ground good 
inductive reasonings, and that arguments which are either inadequate or have at 
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least one false premise will explain why all other reasonings, whether deductive or 
inductive, are bad. 
What ofa distinction between deductive and inductive logic? Given my frame-
work, one could say that deductive logic is the study of arguments <all argu-
ments!) in terms of validity and invalidity. On the other hand, inductive logic is the 
study of arguments <all arguments!) in terms of adequacy <not including validity) 
and inadequacy. In other words, you are doing deductive logic if your adequacy 
standard is validity, and doing inductive logic if your adequacy standard is some-
thing less than validity. 
To sum up: The mere fact that drawing a distinction between deductive and 
inductive arguments has been the actual practice of philosophers and logicians for 
over two thousand years does not establish that we really need to make such a 
distinction. At the same time, the pervasiveness of the making of a distinction can 
be explained by the fact that we can, if we wish, distinguish deductive reasoning 
from inductive reasoning or deductive logic from inductive logic without having to 
distinguish deductive arguments from inductive arguments, As long as we do not 
conllate reasoning processes with the arguments that may help justify them or try 
defining logics in terms of types of arguments, we can distinguish types of rea-
sonings and logics in terms of validity and adequacy instead. 
Objection 2: Appropriateness 
David Hitchcock writes: 
As several of my critics pointed out .... in maintaining that there is more than 
one type of validity, I implicitly commit myself to criteria for determining 
which standard of validity is appropriate for a given argument. Thus, the 
distinction between deductive and inductive ... arguments reappears as the 
distinction between arguments for whose appraisal standards of deductive 
validity are appropriate and those for which inductive standards are appro-
priate. lI . 
Hitchcock ultimately accepts the objection and so someone might apply the same 
objection to my account, claiming that I, too, presuppose a distinction between 
arguments for which validity is the appropriate standard and thOse for which some 
less stringent adequacy standard is appropriate. 
Reply: Hitchcock is wrong to take the criticism seriously. The mere fact that 
my account has different degrees of adequacy does not entail that I need to clas-
sify arguments into those for which validity is the appropriate'standard and those 
for which some lesser standard is appropriate. Firstly, there is no reason that one 
and the same argument cannot have more than one evaluative property just as one 
and the same student can meet a variety of evaluative standards. A student can 
have all A ' s, can have a 93.4% average, can be on the Dean's List, etc. Similarly, 
an argument in virtue of the actual strength of the connection that holds between 
premises and conclusion might be both valid and adequate, or it might be invalid 
but adequate, or it might be both invalid and inadequate. 
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Even advocates of the distinction talk as if arguments can have more than one 
evaluative property. For example, consider: 
(3) A few patrons got sick. George was a patron, so George got sick. 
(3) is a bad argument. Why? Because it is neither valid nor, speaking with the 
vulgar, inductively strong. Assuming all arguments are either valid or invalid or 
strong or weak, if tile argument truly is neither valid nor inductively strong, then it 
is both invalid and inductively weak. But if arguments can be both invalid and 
weak, why not both valid and strong or, invalid but strong? 
Secondly, the appropriate standard is independent of any given argument-
what standard is appropriate depends upon the context in which the argument is 
given, and not on the argument itself. Reconsider argument (I)-All examined 
emeralds up to now are green, so the next emerald examined will be green. In the 
context of Descartes Meditations , which demands absolute certainty, this argu-
ment would be inadequate, but in other less stringent contexts it would be ad-
equate. Since the argument is unchanged from context to context, and yet the 
standards of adequacy change, adequacy standards are independent of arguments. 
All that different adequacy standards presuppose is criteria for determining from 
the context which degree of adequacy is appropriate or required for the arguer's 
goals to be achieved. Nowhere do I presuppose that there are different kinds of 
arguments for each degree of adequacy. 
Objeclion 3: Oh Ihal Induclive Feeling 
Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow, among others, note that inductive arguments 
have a 'distinctive aroma.''' Hence, one might point to the least intuitive way that 
we can quickly classify arguments into either deductive vs . induc·tive as an indica-
tor that these types exist. There have to be two different ~orts of arguments- the 
two sorts just reel (or smell) different! 
Reply: What we can do quite quickly in many instances is recognize that an 
argument is valid. For example, consider: 
(4) All people are mortal. Socrates is a person, so Socrates is mortal. 
or . 
(5) George Sands is either a man or a woman. George is not a man, so 
George is a woman. 
We can also recognize that any argument of the same form will be valid. Some 
of these forms we have given special names, such as categorical syllogism or 
disjunctive syllogism. At the same time we can also recognize other arguments 
that are not valid , but are often adequate (even if we cannot immediately produce 
a context in w~ich it is adequate.) For example, consider: 
(6) The sun has risen every day prior to and including today, so the sun 
will rise tomorrow. 
or 
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(7) Most glasses dropped from the top of hundred story buildings shat-
ter. So, this glass will shatter if dropped from the top of a hundred 
story building. 
Just as before, we recognize that these arguments have a form or structure 
that can be utilized (though perhaps not with the same generality that valid forms 
can be) to produce, in appropriate contexts, non-valid but adequate arguments. 
Now one might say that we have revealed two classes of arguments: deductive 
and inductive respectively. One could say this, but then 'deductive' would just be 
another term for 'valid' and 'inductive' would be short for 'non-valid, but ad-
equate ' ." I already recognize those classes of arguments. What does not follow, 
however, is that we are discovering a class of arguments to which it is appropriate 
to apply the standard of validity and a class to which it is appropriate to apply the 
standard of non-valid, but adequate. After all, we determined the class by recog-
nizing that the arguments satisfy the standard and not the other way around. Also, 
the usual intent of saying that it is appropriate to apply a given standard is to say 
that given argument A, it is appropriate to check whether A does or does not 
satisfy the standard. But in this case it is not appropriate. We already know that the 
argument satisfies the standard since that is how we classified the argument to 
begin with. 
To summarize: We can account for the alleged distinctive 'flavor' or 'aroma' 
that arguments have in terms of 'validity ' and 'non-vaJid, but adequate'. Hence. 
we do not have reason to distinguish inductive from deductive arguments. 
Objection 4: The History of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Science 
Historically, the distinction between deductive and inductive arguments is perva-
sive. Hence, to teach the history of philosophy accurately we need to make the 
distinction ourselves. For example, to teach Aristotle's, Locke's, or Hume's views 
on arguing will require making the distinction. And speaking of Hume, how can 
we teach Hume's problem of induction without appealing to the distinction? Even 
worse, the problem of induction has become one of the major problems of 20th 
century philosophy of science. Even more generally than just the problem of in-
duction, many 20th century accounts of scientific explanation rest upon a distinc-
tion between inductive and deductive arguments. Hence, to teach the philosophy 
of science accurately we need to make the distinction ourselves. 
Reply: Despite the broad scope of this objection, it has two main components, 
which I shall deal with in turn. Firstly. I admit that to teach the history of philo so-
phy accurately we may need to say something like, 'Locke made a distinction 
between two sorts of arguments, deductive and inductive, and here is his distinc-
tion.' (I am not convinced this is what we would say to teach Locke accurately, 
but suppose it were). I will also admit that to teach some aspects of the philosophy 
of science correctly we lTIay need to say something like, 'Carl Hempel altempts to 
distinguish two sorts of arguments, deductive and inductive, on the basis of which 
he posits two kinds of scientific explanation.' Does it follow from either of these 
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facts that there are two sorts of arguments, deductive and inductive? No. For 
Locke and Hempel may haVe gotten things wrong and tried making a distinction 
that just wasn't there. Consider, for example, teaching Descartes's distinction 
between material and immaterial substances. Just because Descartes makes the 
distinction, are we thereby comm itted to two sorts of substances? No. For Descartes 
might have gotten things wrong. The mere fact that the distinction is pervasive 
does not imply· that it is correct. After all, many times we present distinctions 
which are problematic precisely to demonstrate that they are problematic. 
Secondly, Hume' s 'problem of induction' can be stated and tentative solutions 
suggested without having to appeal to a distinction between deductive and induc-
tive arguments." In a nutshell, the 'problem of induction' is merely the problem 
of justifying concluding something like 'the next emerald examined will be green' 
or 'all emeralds are green' from something like 'all emeralds observed up until 
now have been green.' If one demands valid arguments as the only grounds for 
justifying a reasoning process, then, as Hume points out, induction (the reasoning 
process) is unjustifiable, for to produce a valid argument we will need to add an 
additional premise such as 'the future will resemble the past in the relevant re-
spects.' Unfortunately, our justification of that premise will rely on a claim such 
as 'the future has resembled the past in the relevant respects up until now.' But 
then our 'justification' of induction is circular for we are appealing to the very 
reasoning process we are trying to justify. 
On the other hand, if one allows that invalid, but still adequate, arguments 
might ground a reasoning process, then solving the ' problem of induction' is 
merely showing that in some contexts in which achieving certainty is impossible, 
such as the context of scientific research and discovery, the observed evidence 
provides sufficient support for the conclusion in question. In other words, to 
show that an inductive reasoning process is justified is just to show that the degree 
of support t~e evidence conveys upon the conclusion is at least as great as the 
strength required by the context in which we advance the conclusion. Without 
doubt, actually demonstrating that the evidence sufficiemly supports the conclu-
sion may be an extremely difficult task, but that does not alter the fact that such a 
demonstration would solve the 'problem of induction.' 
So, stating and discussing possible solutions to the problem of induction does 
not commit us to a distinction between deductive and inductive arguments. In-
stead the problem can be stated in terms of finding an argument to ground a 
certain sort of reasoning process. If only valid arguments will be accepted as the 
necessary ground, then there is evidence that inductive reasoning cannot be justi-
fied. If invalid but adequate arguments will be accepted, then we just need to show 
that there are such arguments. Hence, we need not be committed to a bOlla fide 
distinction between deductive and inductive arguments to teach or account for the 
problem of induction or to teach either the philosophy of science or the history of 
philosophy. 
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Objection 5: implicit Premises 
James Freeman writes: 
It is a commonplace that arguments are frequently stated incompletely. In~ 
deed, supplying suppressed premises is a central topic in informal logic 
courses. When supplying a suppressed premise, there are two considera-
tions to keep in mind. First, in a broad sense of logical including deductive 
and inductive concerns, the supplied premise must be logically needed if the 
argument is to be correct. ... To the extent that we can determine the inten-
tions of the person putting forward the argument. our supplied premise must 
be in accord with those intentions.25 
Freeman uses the following example: 
(8) All Senators are politicians, so 
All Senators are amoral. 
of which he writes: 
Adding either 
(a) All politicians are amoral 
or 
(b) Most politicians are amoral 
gives us a set of premises relevant to the conclusion. But I expect we all 
would regard the first as the correct premise to add, barring contextual evi-
dence to the contrary. Why? ... We choose (a) because we recognize that ... 
[(8)] ... is an incompletely stated categorical syllogism and so a deductive 
argument, and (a) produces a deductively correct argument. Hence, recog-
nizing ... [(8)] ... as a deducti ve argument was a distinct factor in the process 
of identify ing the proper suppressed premise to add .... 
... Therefore, we see that judging whether arguments are deductive or in-
ductive is a distinct step in the process of supplying suppressed premises. 
This is one reason for regarding the inductive/deducti ve di stinction as ap-
plying to arguments. 26 
Reply: Without doubt, Freeman is correct to suppose that when adding sup-
pressed premises we should, as much as possible, provide a premise that accords 
with the arguer's intentions. But does it follow that we need to judge whether an 
argument is deductive or inductive when supplying implicit premises? I think not. 
As Freeman himself admits , when the arguer 's intentions are explicit they do not 
involve what kind of argument is being propounded, but rather a claim about the 
strength of the relationship between premises and conclusion. Such claims need 
not be interpreted as claims about type of argument, but rather as claims about 
what standards the argument satisfies. Hence, if someone provides the argument: 
(9) All monkeys are primates, so with certainty all monkeys are mam-
mals, 
we need not recognize this as an incomplete categorical syllogism to know that the 
suppressed premise is probably 'all primates are mammals.' [nstead we can rec-
ognize that the arguer, through the use of 'with certainty' means his argument to 
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satisfy the standard of validity. The weakest premise that will satisfy validity is ' all 
primates are mammals. ) Hence, we add that premise without ever needing to 
determine what kind of argument is being put forward. 
Instead of attempting to determine the sort of argument the arguer intends in 
order to produce suppressed premises, I would advocate the following suppressed 
premise principle: 
SPP: Where the arguer's intentions are explicit, add the weakest that 
will make the argument satisfy the standards the arguer intends his or 
her argument to satisfy. Where the arguer's intentions are not explicit 
add, if possible, the weakest premise that (i) is consistent with the argu-
er's other explicit views and (ii) makes the argument satisfy the stand-
ard required in the argument context. 
But what if the arguer's intentions are made explicit by a claim such as 'all my 
arguments are deductive arguments'? Given that the deductive/inductive distinc-
tion has been long applied to arguments, we can expect people to express their 
intentions in tenns of this unnecessary and quite possibly inadequate distinction. 
Regardless, we can still interpret their intentions as intentions about what stand-
ards they hope their arguments will satisfy, rather than taking them literally at their 
word. In other words, the claim that ' all my arguments are deductive' should be 
taken as indicating 'all my argument need to satisfy the standard of validity.' We 
can, therefore, respect arguer's intentions and still supply suppressed premises 
without ever appealing to a distinction between types of arguments. 
Conclusion 
So end the objections. Unless other, more cogent, reasons are forthcoming I see 
no reason to even attempt to divide arguments into deductive and inductive kinds. 
The work we wish to accomplish with arguments can be accomplished without 
appeal to this distinction. We can add suppressed premises, evaluate arguments, 
distinguish deductive from inductive reasoning, distinguish deductive from induc-
tive logic, and teach the philosophy of science, the problem of induction, and the 
history of philosophy perfectly well without appealing to some mythical distinc-
tion between inductive and deductive arguments. For any argument the first ques-
tion should not be-'is it deductive or inductive?' , but rather should be-' is it 
adequate?' Rescher is wrong- the distinction between deductive and inductive 
arguments is not one of the most important and fundamental ideas in logic- rather 
it is one of the most prevalent distractions in logic. 
Notes 
• Ancestors of this paper wert! read at the University of Richmond in April , 2000 and 10 the 
Virginia Philosophical Association in October, 2000. My thanks to bOlh aud iences for their 
comments, and especially to Michael Gettings, my commentator at the latter reading. 
'Rescher (t 964): 60. 
16 G.c. Goddll 
'Cop; and Cohen (1998): 28. 
'Kelley (1998): 191-192. 
4Freeman (1993): 218. 
5Many of these versions fall into natural groups. Bowles (1994); 159·184, does an extensive 
analysis of many types of the deductive/inductive argument distinction. He rejects many and 
ultimately defends a v1.!rsion of his own. 
6Sec, for example, Capi and Cohen, (1998): 7; Johnson (1992): 9. 
7Sce, for example, Layman (1999): 1. 
'Sec, for example, Bowles (1991): 1. 
9Sce• for example, Bonevac (1999): 3; Bergmann, Moor, and Nelson (1998): I; Hurlcy (1997): I. 
!USee, for example, Tidman and Kahane (1999): I; Hardegree ( 1994): 3. 
I I Descartes ( 1993): 14. 
Il lf you object that the truth or lhe premises is lao strong a requirement and that the premises 
merely need 10 be highly plausible or reasonable or whatever, then substitute whatever adequacy 
condit ion you want ror the premises in thedefinition-it will have no bearing on the argument.;; of 
this paper. 
IlFor some the indeterminacy is enough to argue that there is no inductive logic at all. See, for 
example. Bigelow and Pargetter (1998): 464·472; and Sellars, (1970): 83-103. 
'"'Though, given (i) the ever increasing compie:<ity of new proofs and (ii) the specialization of 
mathematicians to the point that very few are competen t to detennine the adequacy of a given 
proof, there have been some discussion of lowering the standard in mathematics lest progress in 
mathematics be halted . 
'lThis assumes that determining whether the premises arc true or whether the argument begs the 
question or is circular or is redundant does not depend upon making the distinction. Since no one 
who advocates making the di stinctio n has argued that it is necessary for making these 
determinations, I shall continue to make the assumption. 
"'Fohr, (1980) : 6. 
" Govier, ( 1980) : 8. 
'ZThough of course many do si nce they define or e:<plain deductive reasoning or logic in terms of 
deductive arguments. 
19See for example, Pargetter and Bigdow( 1997): 62.63. 
z;'Mark Vorobej , for c:<ample, in his defense of a psychologically based definition of deductive 
arguments against other definitions docs not distinguish reason ings from arguments and defines 
deductive arguments in a manner almost identical with how I define deductive reasonings. Regard-
less, while I agree with many of hi s arguments as applied to reasonings, whether his deflllition of 
deductive arguments is better than other such definitions is irrelevant to my current project of 
showing that we need not try to define a class of arguments as deductive at all. Sec Vorobej , 
( 1992). 
"liilchcock, (1981) : 15, See also Govier (1980): 3 and Fohr (1980) : 7, 
'J ('argctter and Bigelow ( 1997): 65 . 
2l Bowlc.s (1994) and Vorob~j ( 1992) , for example, both criticize eq uat ing 'deductive' with ' valid' 
and 'i nductive ' with ' non-valid, but adequate' , on the grounds that a minimal adequacy condition 
on definitions or types of argument is that the definition allow for both adequate and inadequate 
arguments of each type. 
HGiven the extensive literature on the problem of induction andjustifying induction a full defense 
of this claim would requ ire more space than I can devote to it here. 
n Freeman (1984): 39. 
16Freeman ( 1984): 40. 
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